3 international constitutionalism tends to reinforce legality of various norms and institutions of international law. Lawyers engaged with international constitutionalism tend to idealise human rights. None of the critiques made by feminist international lawyers is taken into account. International human rights law with all its gaps and deficiencies often even serves as the ultimate legitimising argument. This article will attempt to demonstrate that to continue theorising international constitutionalism without taking into account feminist critiques of international law will ultimately lead to strengthening of gaps and deficiencies of international law in general and human rights law in particular, leaving interests of many human beings, majority of whom will be women, out of consideration. Moreover, in my view, international constitutionalism will also lose any claim to legitimacy. In order to avoid these outcomes, there is not only a need for mutual exchange between feminist and constitutionalist lawyers, but also a need for international lawyers to explore the notion of legitimacy and its use in the doctrine of international constitutionalism.
I will start by explaining the importance of the concept of legitimacy for theorisation of international constitutionalism. As a next step, major trends in the constitutionalist doctrine of international law will be presented, followed by an analysis of the notion of legitimacy as it is applicable to international constitutionalism. I will present one vision of legitimacy which comes closer than any other to my own understanding of this concept. The central part of the article will serve to demonstrate how both the international constitutionalism and even the most advanced vision of its legitimacy leave many individuals, in particular women out of consideration. I will conclude by indicating future directions both for international constitutionalism and the understanding of legitimacy in international law.
B. On Legitimacy and Legality in International Constitutionalsim
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Why should legitimacy and not only legality be important when talking about law, and more particularly about constitutional law? I will mention just two reasons which appear to be fundamental to my inquiry.
The first more general reason is linked to what I consider to be a broadly accepted vision of law. Law is no longer regarded through a criminal law prism. Law is not limited to rules imposed by a sovereign (be it a person or a group of persons) and compliance ensured through threat of sanctions. Rather, law is understood as an ordercreating and maintaining mechanism, where compliance is achieved through voluntary adherence to rules based on their acceptance as legitimate.
5 Such legitimacy-based compliance gains particular importance at the level of international law where possibilities of enforcement by other means are extremely limited.
Another reason is derived from the fact that the subject-matter of the study is constitutionalism. In many instances legitimacy plays an important role in the context of constitutionalisation and constitutionalism. 6 Without transposing directly to the international plane issues discussed in relation to legitimacy in constitutional theory relating to domestic law, I will analyse some aspects of theorisation of constitutionalisation of international law in the mainstream doctrine. The literature on constitutionalism and constitutionalisation in international law is constantly growing.
And although it is too early to affirm the existence of a constitution or constitutionalism 5 See e.g. Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, The Concept of Law (2 nd ed., 1997) p. 39 in particular; Rosalyn
Higgins, Problems and Processes: International Law and How We Use It (1994), p. 1 in particular. 6 One of the most difficult questions in political and legal theory which inevitably brings to the surface Finally, it is important to understand that the notion of legitimacy should not and does not replace legality. As I attempted to point out above, legitimacy fulfils its own important functions which do not overlap with functions of legality although often they are closely interrelated.
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C. Deficiencies of Theorisation of Constitutionalisation of International Law in the Mainstream Doctrine
The mainstream doctrine theorises constitutionalisation of international law from several perspectives: some authors pay particular attention to the nature of norms of international law (jus cogens, erga omnes, human rights obligations), 8 and attribute central role to the Charter of the United Nations.
9
All contributions stress the changing nature of sovereignty in international law and mention human rights as an important part of the process of constitutionalisation.
Some refer to human rights as ethical core of international constitution, others as a part of common interests of mankind that bind states and international organisations.
Some authors also argue that one of the manifestations of constitutionalisation of international law is the new understanding of statehood. While traditional international law made emphasis on effectiveness of the government, modern international law requires legitimacy through democracy and respect for human rights. 10 The requirement of democracy and even promotion of democratic ordering of nation-states constitutes an important aspect of discussions around the constitutionalisation of international law. While I do not dispute that the international legal order is undergoing significant modifications, nature of these modifications is questioned. In my opinion they do not necessarily mean more respect for individual rights and more legitimacy of international law.
I will particularly concentrate on the use of human rights rhetoric in theorising and conceptualising international constitutionalism. Thus, it might well be correct to affirm that "the core of constitutionalised international law is the general acceptance of a common interest of mankind that transcends the sum of individual state interests."
13
But it is dangerous and naïve to take for granted and not to question the presumably 'common' nature of this interest, at least as far as prioritisation is concerned. Moreover, from the point of view of feminist analysis the use of the term 'mankind' instead of 'humanity' highlights biases or at least indifference of the writer.
In a similar way, it is enchanting to affirm that one of the unique functions of the international human rights legal system is "that it enshrines -and clarifies -the distinct normative basis for the protection of fundamental human rights as rights of human 
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The appellant, a citizen of Lebanon was married in her country of origin to a man who according to the facts accepted to be true by judges married her just because of her money. He did not want children and was violent towards his wife. Thus, due to a hit into her stomach her first pregnancy was interrupted and she lost her first child.
When her son was born in 1996, the father came to the hospital just to take the child away from the mother in order to bring him to another country. He was prevented from doing so, and became even more violent and never cared for his wife or his child. The appellant succeeded in obtaining divorce from Lebanese courts. As a result of divorce procedure the custody of the child was attributed to the mother until the child reaches the ages of seven. After that date the custody is automatically transmitted to the father or another male relative of the father's family. The mother could only hope to obtain occasional and supervised visitation rights in a place designated by court, but not at her home.
On the approach of the seventh birthday of her son in order to avoid losing her son the appellant first left the place of her habitual residence and in December 2004 managed to come to the United Kingdom with her son, where she applied for asylum.
Her asylum application was rejected. As was initially her application to remain in the country on humanitarian grounds. 41 The reasoning behind these rejections is quite similar to that in the case of Nada. Moreover, even while finally granting to the appellant the right to stay in the United Kingdom on humanitarian grounds members of 
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and ultimately perhaps to protect her child from father's abuse is not a persecution. 44 The very fact that such a regulation on guardianship upon divorce places women in a highly dependant position and subjects them to whimsical will of their husbands sometimes putting them in a slave-like position either does not seems to be important to judges or does not appear to them at all.
Another troubling aspect of this case appears in the opinion of 60 Lord Justice Carnwath of the Supreme Court indirectly expressed these concerns when he commented on the decision of the single judge: "The single judge felt able to infer that "there is every likelihood that she will be allowed visitation rights." The basis for this is not clear to me (…)" Judgement, supra note 40, para. 6 However, he did not develop this argument further because according to him the claimant did not establish to the necessary standard that she would not obtain visitation rights. (Id.) 30 article 3 of the ECHR and regarded as sufficient to establish a case for allowing a foreigner to stay in the receiving country?
These arguments are a perfect demonstration of a way in which legality of gaps and deficiencies of human rights law reinforced by international constitutionalism can serve to exclude vulnerable individuals from the benefit of human rights protection.
Implied in the reasoning is also the argument that economy and well-being of progressive developed states is more important than protection of fundamental human rights of foreigners, which obviously is a complete denial of constitutionalist's values and associates in my mind with extraordinary rendition. This brings me to another area which serves as an example for my arguments.
(In)secure Sovereignties and Migration
As explained above in relation to theorisation of constitutionalism in the mainstream doctrine of international law, although to various degrees, the majority of authors would agree that sovereignty undergoes nowadays significant modifications. At certain points, States effectively lose parts or bits of their sovereignty and have to admit their inability to control some areas which traditionally belonged to the untouchable sphere of their internal affairs.
I argue that in response to this weakening of sovereignty in certain areas states tend or attempt to exercise more intense control over other areas which previously were considered of lesser importance to affirmation of state's sovereignty, or lesser control was considered sufficient for affirmation of exercise of sovereign rights in such areas.
The most important of these areas is migration and thus control over people crossing state's borders.
How are interests and needs of migrants taken into account in these processes? When he employs the term 'gender' in this context, he necessarily suggests that there is one which is better than the other. Without discussing here the appropriateness of this allegorical use of the term, I think that unwittingly, by using this expression the author also raised more questions than he intended, first and foremost about legitimacy and ethical value of such operations, but also about the means used to impose the gender of the child and the final result of the operation which somehow deviated from initial project and the child still behaves as he or she (we are left here with our own preferences) did before the operation. I would like first to recall the notion of 'democratie à venir' developed by Jacques Derrida because it illustrates better certain aspects of this legitimasing democracy. Thus, he attracts our attention to the fact that this 'democratie à venir' does not mean that 'democraties est à venir' (democracy is to come). Rather this expression reminds us that democracy will never exist in the sense of present existence because democracy is 'aporetic' in its structure returning constantly to such fundamental characteristics of democracy as self-critic and perfectibility. As a consequence, it also helps us to protest in its own name against any political abuse, rhetoric claiming to have actually established democracy. of human rights. We need institutions, legal and political systems to organise our life, but we shall do our best to keep them human, not letting them to attract us back to abstraction and over-generalisation. This is particularly important and difficult at the level of international law, where we have to deal with abstract collective entities.
I will conclude with a quotation from a book analysing philosophical thought of 
